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Europeanization and the dilemma of decentralization:
centre–local* relations in Turkey
AYLIN GU¨NEY and AYS¸E ASLIHAN C¸ELENK
Introduction
Turkey’s long quest to join the European Union (EU) entered a new phase
following the decision taken on 3 October 2005 to start accession negotiations.
During the preceding two decades, Turkey had been undergoing a major
transformation in order to be able to meet the criteria imposed by the EU. This
transformation has continued during the accession negotiations because there
are many issues that need to be addressed to make the Turkish state system
compatible with the European acquis communautaire.1
Sub-national structures in European politics have become an important part
of the acquis as actors in implementing the regional policies of the EU. These
policies aim to reduce intra-regional disparities within the Union through re-
allocation of resources benefiting the citizens. This has led to local government
models, the principle of subsidiarity and minority issues being at the centre of
multi-level governance and regional policy debates within the EU, and they are
being discussed within the context of centre–local relations in Europe.
One important issue that will pose a challenge to the Turkish authorities
during the accession negotiations are the chapters related to decentralization2
and possible devolution of power from the centre. Although the Turkish state
has tried to develop proposals with respect to decentralization in the context of
Europeanization, it has had to approach the issue with the utmost care since
decentralization is seen as an infringement upon the centralized and unitary
character of the Turkish state by certain segments of the bureaucratic and
political elite.
This paper examines the understandings of decentralization in the European
and Turkish contexts and will address the possible challenges and opportunities
that await Turkey as it tries to further integrate with Europe. To do this, the paper
ISSN 1944-8953 print/ISSN 1944-8961 online/10/030241-17 q 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2010.506810
* The term ‘local’ refers to both the lower tiers of government/governance apart from the central
level of government and also to periphery as a power bloc versus the centre.
1 The acquis communautaire refers to the rules, laws and procedures of the European Community
that have accumulated through the course of European integration and that the candidate countries
are expected to adopt in order to join the Community.
2 Decentralization can be defined in two basic ways: as ‘physical dispersal of operations to local
offices or delegation; or devolution of a greater degree of decision-making authority to lower levels of
administration or government’ (see Burns et al., The Politics of Decentralization: Revitalizing Local
Democracy, Macmillan, London, 1994). The concept entails localization, flexibility and accountability in
the delivery of services, devolution of power and an organizational cultural change to achieve these
for creating local level democratic governance.
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will focus on the local government tradition, first in Europe and then in Turkey.
Second, it will deal with the recent decentralization efforts in Turkey within the
context of Europeanization.
‘Europeanization’ and decentralization: a theoretical framework
Europeanization can be understood as the process in which certain
institutionalized aspects of government and administrative cultures of the
member states change as a result of EU-level policies. In other words, it is ‘the
impact that European policies in particular and European integration in general
have on national polities, politics and policies’.3
Knill and Lehmkuhl identify three mechanisms of Europeanization.4 In the
first mechanism, the EU prescribes an institutional model, to which domestic
arrangements have to adjust and where the member states have limited
institutional discretion. This mechanism concerns institutional compliance that is
prescriptive and demands that member states adopt specified measures. For
instance, with respect to the implementation of the regional policies of the EU,
from the late 1990s onwards, the Commission identified ‘regional institutional
capacity’ as a core requirement. Second, EU legislation alters the distribution of
power and resources among actors, which in turn requires institutional change.
For instance, the Customs Union, which has been operating between Turkey and
the EU since 1996, has had a significant impact on regional competitiveness,
by exposing economies to the challenges and opportunities of globalization,
increasing the need to develop regional institutional capacity. The third
mechanism of Europeanization is framing or shaping domestic beliefs and
expectations. This changes the political climate by stimulating and strengthening
overall support for broader European reform objectives, since changes in
domestic beliefs can produce institutional adaptation over time. Policy learning
plays an important part in this mechanism.5
Regional governance units and an efficient system of public administration at
regional and local levels are seen by the European Commission as essential for
both the implementation of the acquis on regional policy and the dispersion of
structural funds. In fact, a large number of studies relate ‘Europeanization’ to the
strengthening of sub-national governance.6 Despite the demand for changes in
governance and regional policy, the degree and nature of change that takes place
in the accession countries depends on their specific domestic institutional
settings. This usually takes the form of persistence and robustness on the part of
the decentralizing state,7 and has a lot to do with the way that the philosophy and
practice of decentralization or local government has evolved in the European and
domestic contexts. In other words, particular domestic institutional factors have
shaped the way in which the EU has affected the relations between the central
3 A. E. To¨ller, ‘The Europeanization of public policies—understanding idiosyncratic mechanisms
and contingent results’, European Integration Online Papers, 2004, p. 1.
4 Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, ‘How Europe matters: different mechanisms of
Europeanization’, European Integration Online Papers, 1999.
5 E. Ertugal, ‘Strategies for regional development: challenges facing Turkey on the road to EU
membership’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 4(3), 2005.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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and sub-national structures of government in different countries, and thus
they have led to different modes of centre–local relations, despite the similar
pressures for change coming from the EU level.
In the EU context, the issues of decentralization and empowerment of the
local level vis-a`-vis the centre are interrelated with the principle of subsidiarity.
The roots of the principle lie in the Catholic Church and are based on the idea of
‘protecting the private sphere against any undue interference from the state’.8
According to the subsidiarity principle, the state is only expected to intervene in
matters of the private sphere of citizens when the actions of the private parties
are unable to achieve certain objectives. The principle of subsidiarity implies that
‘decisions and laws should be made at the most appropriate level of government,
as close to people as practicable’.9 According to this principle, powers should be
exercised by local or lower levels and they should only be assigned to higher
levels of government if there exist convincing and rational reasons to do so.10
Decentralization is integral to the application of the subsidiarity principle
because the principle is based on allocating authority to the lowest possible level,
that is, closest to the citizens. It covers not only the fulfilment of certain duties
and services assigned to the local level by the centre, but also the dispersion of
decision-making power among different levels of government, beginning with
the lowest possible level.
In a multi-layered polity, such as the EU, the principle of subsidiarity is crucial
as a means of finding the appropriate balance of power between different levels
of government. In the EU, the division of power among community institutions,
member states and central and local/regional levels of government within the
member states is organized in such a way as to maintain the legitimacy of
European institutions and bring the community closer to the citizens, while
increasing the participation in the decision-making process of the lowest
levels that are closest to the citizens. According to Article 3b of the Treaty of the
European Union:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within
its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can be better achieved by
the Community.11
Later on, with the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU clarified the criteria for application
of the principle and stated that:
8 ‘Subsidiarity: a preliminary discussion paper’, British Institute of International and Comparative
Law (BICCL), 2003, ,http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/BICCL_subsidiarity. (accessed 25
September 2006).
9 Beverly Singer, The European Union and Its Citizens: The Social Agenda, Greenwood Press, London,
1994, p. 3 and Wayne David, ‘1996—an opportunity to make Europe relevant’, in Valerie Symes, Carl
Levy and Jane Littlewood (eds), The Future of Europe: Problems and Issues for the 21st Century,
Macmillan, London, 1997, p. 7.
10 ‘Making sense of subsidiarity: how much centralization for Europe?’, Centre for Economic Policy
Research (CEPR) Annual Report, 1993.
11 Maastricht Treaty, 1992, ,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.
html..
Europeanization and the dilemma of decentralization 243
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:4
9 2
9 M
ay
 20
15
 
Community action is preferred to national level action where the issue under
consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by
the action of Member States; actions by Member States alone or lack of Community
action would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty or would otherwise
significantly damage Member States’ interests; action at the Community level
would produce clear benefits by reasons of its scale or effects compared with action
at the level of the Member States.12
Given these criteria of application, it can be inferred that another aim of
subsidiarity is to find a balance between non-interference and intervention by
higher levels of government/governance, in addition to devolving authority
to the local level. Within the context of EU politics, the principle of subsidiarity
limits EU action in the areas where it has no exclusive EU competence, and
protects the role of the member states in EU policy making. At the state level,
the subsidiarity principle is crucial for the empowerment of the local level,
not only in terms of its duties and functions, but also in terms of its authority
to make decisions and create resources to fulfil those functions. Thus,
decentralization leads to different outcomes in terms of centre–local relations
according to the extent of the application of the subsidiarity principle, as the
different experiences of decentralization in the European and Turkish contexts
will reveal.
Local government and decentralization in the European context
Local government is a key element in the political systems of Europe’s liberal
democracies13 because of its role in representing the concerns and views of the
locality.14
The term ‘local government’ refers to political institutions that are subject
to directly elected policy makers. Local governments, whether they be a small
commune or large populous regions, are established by national or federal polities
that retain the right to regulate through legislation the power and functions of their
subordinate local units. They are largely creations of the state and are sustained by
it, although they may also, in turn, have a major influence on central decision-
making. Therefore, the interrelationships that exist between local and central
authorities frame the local system of government, which cannot be considered as
an isolated political structure.15
In Western liberal thought, local government is usually associated with
greater democracy, since the scale of representation and administration is
small and easy to manage. It thereby allows, to a greater degree, a close
relationship between the ruled and the ruler, and a more effective accountability
mechanism. It also provides an opportunity for political participation and
12 Protocol 7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997,,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/
htm/11997D.html#0105010010..
13 Richard Batley and Gary Stoker, ‘Introduction’, in Richard Batley and Gary Stoker (eds), Local
Government in Europe: Trends and Developments, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1991, p. 1.
14 Ibid.
15 J. A. Chandler, ‘Introduction’, in J. A. Chandler (ed.), Local Government in Liberal Democracies: An
Introductory Survey, Routledge, London, 1993.
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expression that can have a role in a democratic political system.16 It is because of
this linkage between local government and democracy that some thinkers like
Alexis de Tocqueville referred to local government as the ‘school of democracy’.
Norton argues that:
in twentieth-century Western Europe the most outstanding political developments
have been the universalization of electoral democracy linked with the maturation
of the party system, both at national and local levels. These have been guaranteed
in many European countries by the development of the constitutional system as
the principal means to maintain individual rights and the associated rights of local
communal autonomy.17
Local government has a long history in the European context, with the feudal
period being of particular importance in both its birth and continuation. When
one looks at a map of the various European regions today, it is possible to see that
most of the sub-national borders correspond to the local or regional states of
the feudal period. Although there are deep differences between centre–local
relations in different European systems due to their historical backgrounds, there
is also a common ground due to this feudal heritage of localism. Historically,
what was common in particular was the tradition of free or chartered cities and
boroughs, based on an acceptance by the state of the contribution they made to
the shared wealth as free centres of wealth and commerce, controlling their own
fiscal systems and levying direct local taxes on individuals.18
Local government has also gained greater importance in contemporary
Europe for a number of reasons connected with changes in its economic and
political significance and its relation to central government in the aftermath of
the Second World War. Local government became regarded as an important
delivery vehicle for welfare state functions in countries such as the UK and West
Germany, as well as in Scandinavia, and thus became an important economic
and political actor. This meant the question of autonomy was raised in regard to
the distribution of resources.19
The demands for decentralization in countries like Spain and Italy developed
as a reaction against past authoritarian regimes. In the transition from
authoritarianism to democracy, these countries have carried out a great degree
of decentralization as a result of both the demand from localities and the need to
limit centralized state power.20 It is important to note, however, that there are
also certain limits to the decentralization process. In countries like France, Italy,
Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Greece, it is possible to see some common patterns
with regard to these limits. For instance, the right to local government is a part
of their constitutions, but financial and administrative rights are vested in the
central government and the state has the right to monitor the legality of the
16 Ibid.
17 A. Norton, ‘Western European local government in comparative perspective’, in Richard Batley
and Gary Stoker (eds), Local Government in Europe: Trends and Developments, St Martin’s Press, New
York, 1991, p. 26.
18 Ibid., pp. 24–25.
19 Chris Pickvance and Edmond Preteceille, ‘Introduction: the significance of local power in theory
and practice’, in Chris Pickvance and Edmund Preteceille (eds), State Restructuring and Local Power.
A Comparative Perspective, Pinter, London and New York, 1991, p. 2.
20 Norton, op. cit., p. 26.
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decisions and actions of local governments. Local government gained further
political prominence in the 1970s as local community groups began to make more
direct demands for state services. The expanded role of the local government
in local economic regeneration is connected with the economic crisis of the
early 1970s onwards due to the effects of cutting welfare state spending.21
Additionally, the link between the local and global levels has become
increasingly important, and local policies and central–local relations can only
be understood in the context of ongoing economic and social changes which are
national, international and global as well as local in scale.22
The changing climate of centre–local relations in the 1970s as a result of
globalization23 and large-scale economic crisis provides an example of the
relationship between the global economic situation and the balance of power
between different levels of government. The social and economic climate of the
1970s created new burdens for the advanced welfare state in Europe and led to
redefinition of centre–local relations throughout Europe. The common trend in
Europe to cope with the problems related with the global economic problems can
be described as ‘the contracting neo-liberal state’,24 where extensive deregulation
and privatization took place, the state cut back the services it previously
provided, public services were marketized, and citizens were perceived as
customers instead of being entitled to certain services.25 This retreat of the central
state, however, did not necessarily imply the empowerment of the local level, as
in some states, such as the UK, the local level was stripped of its functions and
resources through privatization of various services while the power of the centre
remained intact.26 It is also necessary to differentiate the impacts of globalization
from those of European integration over the European countries in terms of
centre–local relations. It is possible to argue that globalization has initiated and
facilitated the Europeanization process because globalization has changed the
preferences and powers of various actors, and this has changed the preferences of
the states concerning EU-level policy making.27 Additionally, while globalization
has inevitable decentralizing and deregulatory effects, in the case of
Europeanization, a political and voluntary component is added, where the
outcome of the process depends on the consent of the interested parties.28
European history can also be read as being a tug-of-war between
localism/regionalism and nationalism. Local affiliations in Europe are so strong
that even in its highly integrated nation-states, there have continued to exist
21 Ibid., p. 4.
22 Ibid., p. 11.
23 Within the context of this analysis, globalization refers to the process of the ‘opening of a state’s
political economy to the entry of products, companies, financial flows and financial operators from
core countries, making state policy dependent upon developments and decisions taken in main
capitalist centres’ (see Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance,
Verso, London and New York, 1999, pp. vii–viii for details).
24 John Louglin, ‘Regional autonomy and state paradigm shifts in Western Europe’, Regional and
Federal Studies, 10(2), 2000, p. 14.
25 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
26 Pickvance and Preteceille, State Restructuring, op. cit., pp. 68–72.
27 H. Marjoleine, ‘Europeanization and globalization: the missing link’, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 39(5), 2001, pp. 834–835.
28 D. Verdier and R. Bren, ‘Europeanization and globalization: politics against markets in the
European Union’, Comparative Political Studies, 34, 2001, pp. 231–232.
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problems of centre–local cleavage up until the present. The doctrine of ‘general
competence’ (i.e. the principle that local authorities have a general power of
jurisdiction over the affairs of their areas and inhabitants, subject to the national
law) has become the norm in Europe. In addition, the EU principle of
‘subsidiarity’ has provided a more recent justification for the special position of
local government because of the priority given to the lowest level government in
carrying out certain tasks.29
The European integration process has added a new dimension to centre–local
dynamics. Since the inception of the integration process in the 1950s, member
states have searched for ways of enabling the centre and the local to coexist in
harmony while introducing a third supranational layer. This has posed the
European Community with a seemingly paradoxical situation, since they
realized that they cannot manage to integrate Europe without first acknowl-
edging that the local and regional levels are important players in this integration
process. At the same time, while trying to integrate with the global market, the
European nation-states have witnessed a resurgence of regionalism.30 Regions
have gained further importance because integration has allowed them to ignore
or bypass national governments and appeal directly to the EU when they have
problems. Consequently, while integration is not intended to discard the nation-
state altogether, it has provided a rationale to justify the assertion of
local/regional activities and identities within the nation-states of Europe.
The EU’s focus on the local and regional increased further with the
Mediterranean enlargement that brought Greece, Spain and Portugal into the EU.
In order to meet the challenge of less-developed regions and regional disparities
in these states, the EU aimed to build local institutional capacities to encourage
these regions to begin utilizing their underused or unused resources.31
The European Charter of Local Self-Government that entered into force on
1 September 1988 reinforced this rising importance of regional/local level of
governance in the integration process.32 Briefly, the Charter commits the parties to
applying basic rules guaranteeing the political, administrative and financial
independence of local authorities. It provides that the principle of local self-
government shall be recognized in domestic legislation and, where practicable, in
the constitution. Local authorities are to be elected by universal suffrage and act
within the limits of the law. They should regulate and manage public affairs
under their own responsibility in the interests of the local population. The Charter
restates the importance of the principle of subsidiarity and sets the conditions
under which responsibilities at the local level are exercised, administrative
supervision of local authorities’ activities are performed, and financial resources
of local authorities and legal protection of local self-government are controlled.
The principles of local self-government contained in the Charter apply to all
categories of local authorities.33
The philosophy creating this charter is also reflected in the creation of the
Committee of Regions in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, and by allowing the
29 Ibid., p. 27.
30 J. Newhouse, ‘Europe’s rising regionalism’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997, p. 68.
31 E. Ertugal, op. cit.
32 ,http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/122.htm..
33 Ibid.
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regions to open representative offices in Brussels, the capital of the EU, to
articulate their own interests and lobby at the Commission. With the increased
presence of local/regional structures on the European political scene, the issues
of decentralization, devolution, federalism and autonomy started to circulate
within the EU member states, making them face the reality that supranational
integration would be very difficult, if not impossible, without recognizing the
regional/local reality of Europe. Thus, during the 1990s, debates started as
to whether EU integration would bypass the national level, which further
aggravated the cleavage between central and local authorities.34
It was the member states themselves who found the methods to balance
central and local authorities. The EU has not tried to impose a uniform model
of centre–local relations in European countries, and has made it clear that the
sharing of certain powers and responsibilities between the central and the local
levels is not dangerous for the integrity of the nation-state, nor will it lead to
fragmentation of the nation-states of Europe. To this end, they have tried to
condemn especially the violent secessionist–autonomist movements of localities
or regions whenever possible, as one can see from the frequent condemnations of
the Basque separatists in Spain. The European Parliament has repeated frequently
that ‘autonomy of the Regions of the European Community and the creation of a
Europe politically more united constitute two complementary and converging
aspects of the same political evolution’.35 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in
mind that the more or less uniform policies of the EU have important implications
for each individual state, which has been shaped to a great extent by its unique
history, political structure, political culture and economic conditions.
To sum up, the overall effect of this long process of European integration and
decentralization is that the ‘decision-making has spilled beyond core representative
institutions and been shared by supranational, national and sub national
authorities’.36 In other words, central authority is dispersed away from central
government upwards (the EU level), downwards (sub-national bodies) and
sideways (public and private agencies).37 In this process, local governments emerge
as the new actors of policy making, who can now bypass central governments and
cooperate directly with the EU or with other local authorities. However, in order to
understand the real dynamics of decision making between these different levels,
one should look beyond the formal allocation of responsibilities to the informal
relations, power balances and administrative cultures within individual states,
which are difficult to change, once institutionalized.
Local government and decentralization in Turkey
As an accession country to the EU, Turkey has faced the above-mentioned
difficulty of changing its institutionalized administrative culture. The Turkish
experience contains important differences from the European experience, both
34 Peter Wagstaff, ‘Introduction: region, nation, identity’, in Peter Wagstaff (ed.), Regionalism in
Europe, Intellect Books, Oxford, 1994, p. 13.
35 S. Petschen, La Europa de Las Regiones [The Europe of Regions], Insitut d’Estudis Autonomicas,
Barcelona, 1992, p. 326.
36 L. Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Types of multi-level governance’, European Integration Online
Papers, 2001, p. 1.
37 Ibid.
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historically and in terms of its current situation. In contrast to many European
countries, the culture of localism or local government in Turkey was never strong
throughout the Ottoman Empire period (13th–20th century). This, of course,
ran in parallel with weaknesses in democratic traditions and decentralized
administration. As already discussed, most European states have a feudal
tradition of localism and have therefore had long experience of managing the
tug-of-war between the centre and the local. Over time, they have managed to a
great extent to solve this problem so as to establish a co-habitation between the
local and the centre within the context of the European integration. In Turkey,
due to the strong state tradition inherited from the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire,
the centre has remained in control of the local and there is not a strong
understanding of local government.
In contrast to feudalism in Europe, under Ottoman patrimonialism, or absolute
rule by the Sultan, the local notables did not have extensive political–territorial
rights. Even the Ottoman Empire’s efforts at modernization that were undertaken
in order to ‘save the empire from disintegration’ during the 19th century did not
change this situation, as they were aimed at strengthening the centre. After the
Tanzimat Edict of 1839, the central administration founded local administrative
bodies, but these bodies had no autonomy. They were just a means of establishing
the control of the centre at the local level.38 In other words, local governments were
established as administrative agencies of the central government in order to
conduct affairs in the localities.39 Until the 19th century, local services were left to
the local notables and the religious organizations and foundations in the empire,
which did not have any political power and were only responsible for the delivery
of various services to the local community. Cities, towns and other residential
areas did not gain distinct legal identities until the 19th century.40 However, the
19th-century reformers tried to establish a strong central government, so they took
these services back under the authority of the central administrative structure.
Paradoxically, because of the lack of infrastructure for a centralized state, the
reformers had to rely on the local structures and people to strengthen the centre,
and this situation led to the birth of local administrative bodies.41 These bodies,
however, were created out of pragmatic necessity, rather than from any deeply
rooted tradition of self-government.
As a result, one can argue that in the 19th century, centre–local relations were
influenced by ‘deconcentration’, that is, extending central control to the localities,
instead of ‘delegation’, that is, transfer of responsibilities and establishment
of indirect control, or ‘devolution’, that is, establishment of sub-national units
of government outside of the centre’s control.42 For instance, in 1864, the Tuna
district was formed as a pilot district with a governor and a district council
38 Sedat Azaklı and Hu¨seyin O¨zgu¨r, ‘Belediyelerde Bas¸kan, Meclis ve Encu¨men Ilis¸kileri ile Gu¨c¸
Dag˘ılımı’, in Bekir Parlak and Hu¨seyin O¨zgu¨r (eds), Avrupa Birligi ile Bu¨tu¨nles¸me Su¨recinde Yerel
Yo¨netimler, Alfa Yayınları, I˙stanbul, 2002, p. 140.
39 Metin Heper, ‘Introduction’, in Metin Heper (ed.), Local Government in Turkey: Governing Greater
Istanbul, Routledge, London, 1989, pp. 3–4.
40 A. O¨ztu¨rk, 21. Yu¨zyil Tu¨rkiye’si Icin Yerel Yo¨netim Modeli, U¨mraniye Belediyesi Ku¨ltu¨r Yayınları,
I˙stanbul, 1997, p. 52.
41 I˙lber Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanli Mahalli Idareleri (1840–1880), Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu
Basımevi, Ankara, 2000, pp. 17–18.
42 Ibid., p. 4.
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and then, in 1870, the application was extended to other districts. The first
municipality was founded in Istanbul in 1854, and in 1868 municipalities were
formed in other districts as well. The 1876 Constitution stated that there would be
elected councils in each municipality.43
However, with the beginning of the 20th century, the decline of the Ottoman
Empire gained pace. The First World War and the subsequent Turkish War of
Independence (1919–22) culminated in the birth of a new state. The new state had
certain similarities with the Ottoman state, such as the important role attributed to
the army and a centralized and bureaucratic state structure. The similarities were
also visible in terms of local administration understanding and the economic and
political problems regarding the division of responsibilities between central
and local levels. The new state also inherited from the Ottoman state a lack of
municipal experience, limited financial means, low levels of public participation
in local affairs and lack of infrastructure. The proclamation of the Republic of
Turkey in 1923 resulted in the adoption of a republican political system, based on
the principles of centralization and delegation as well as administrative tutelage
over local government.44 From the 1930s to the 1980s, there was a high degree of
centralization in the Turkish government system in the form of central political
control over local administrative bodies, instead of simply administrative
supervision.45 In the post-Second World War era, with industrialization and
urbanization, new socio-economic problems emerged, such as housing,
infrastructure building and city planning, which needed to be solved at the
local level. However, the Municipal Law of 1930 gave no attention to the financial
capacity of the municipalities to solve these new and pressing problems.
Especially in the 1970s, as a result of the decline of global and national economic
welfare, the burden on the local administrative units increased, with increased
public demands for welfare services. With the lack of financial capacity, the
inability to solve these new problems increased the dependence of local on central
government, as the tasks of local government were transferred to the centre.46
It is interesting to note that, in Turkey’s case, efforts at decentralization have
usually occurred during the transitions to democracy after military interventions.
For instance, until 1963, mayors were appointed by the centre. It was only after
1963, when the first direct elections were held after the military intervention on
27 May 1960, that mayors became directly elected by local people.47 Similarly,
after the military coup d’e´tat in 1980, a two-tiered metropolitan municipal
system (Bu¨yu¨ks¸ehir belediyeleri) was introduced in 1984 and more powers were
transferred to the metropolitan municipalities. The post-1980 municipal
government reforms reorganized local government with the aim of solving
problems caused by rapid urbanization. However, it also re-established the
control of the centre over the municipalities of major urban centres.48 The tutelage
powers that had earlier been exercised by central government were transferred to
43 Ibid., pp. 57–59.
44 Heper, Local Government, op. cit., p. 4.
45 Metin Heper, ‘Introduction’, in Metin Heper (ed.), Democracy and Local Government: Istanbul in
the 1980s, Eothen Press, Beverley, North Humberside, 1987, p. 1.
46 Heper, Local Government, op. cit., p. 6.
47 Sedat Azaklı and Hu¨seyin O¨zgu¨r, op. cit., p. 141.
48 U¨stu¨n Ergu¨der, ‘Decentralization of local government and political culture in Turkey’, in Heper
(ed.), Democracy, op. cit., p. 11.
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the metropolitan municipalities and more specifically to the metropolitan mayor.
This situation created a potential for conflict because one democratically elected
office holder (the metropolitan mayor) now exercised both legal and
administrative tutelage over other democratically elected office holders with
similar responsibilities, that is, over the district mayors.49 As well as creating
these tensions, decentralization in Turkey after 1980 also stopped short at the
level of the Metropolitan Municipality, and did not extend to the District
Municipalities.
The key reason why decentralization efforts were not very successful in
Turkey was because of the philosophy behind it. It is important to distinguish
between the concept of ‘local government’ used in the European sense and the
term ‘local administration’ used in the Turkish sense. While the former implies
action taken with a certain level of political autonomy or independence, the latter
implies action taken under the direction and administration of the centre over the
periphery. Article 123 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982 stipulates that
‘Administration forms a whole with regard to its structure and functions, and
shall be regulated by law. The organizations and functions of the administration
are based on the principles of centralization and decentralization.’ In this context,
central administration is defined as the ‘organizations that make up the main
administrative structure of the state. These take and implement political,
administrative and economic decisions about the general administration of the
country and are represented at the local level through provincial
administrations.’50 Provincial Administration is comprised of provinces and
districts established to take and implement decisions on behalf of the centre.
These units are headed by provincial and district governors. The provincial
administration, as stated by Article 126 of the Constitution, is based on the
principle of deconcentration.51
The Turkish understanding of local government is that of a mechanism of
delivering services instead of performing a political and democratic function.52
Through their political and administrative influence on the state bureaucracy, the
political elites wish to tightly control local government politics from Ankara, the
seat of the national government. They want to concentrate power in the centre
and keep at bay the periphery through the distribution of patronage to local
persons of influence.53 It has to be the central state, therefore, which performs the
important and traditional functions of distributing welfare and justice. While
performing these functions, the concentration of power at the centre and the
control of the periphery through the distribution of patronage have been
important aspects of this state tradition. Thus, authority is monopolized and
power and resources are distributed by the centre,54 as is the case in other
centralist states of Europe, such as France and Greece.
These centre–local relations in Turkey have important administrative, political
and financial implications. First, regarding administrative relations, the centre
maintains administrative tutelage over the local institutions, and their decisions,
49 Heper, ‘Conclusions’, in Heper (ed.), Democracy, op. cit., pp. 54–55.
50 Turkish Ministry of Interior, Local Authorities in Turkey, Ankara, 1999, p. 23.
51 Ibid.
52 I˙lber Ortaylı, op. cit., p. 4.
53 Ersin Kalaycıog˘lu, ‘Division of responsibility’, in Heper (ed.), Local Government, op. cit., p. 13.
54 Ergu¨der, op. cit., pp. 10–11.
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actions, organs and personnel, in order to keep the local dependent upon the
centre. The provincial administration acts on behalf of the centre at the local level,
while the popularly elected municipalities are under the control and supervision,
that is, administrative tutelage, of the centre.55 Administrative tutelage controls
local affairs in various ways. In order to ensure the integral unity of administration,
secure the delivery of services and protect the interests of the public, the central
government approves, postpones or cancels the decisions taken at the local level.
The centre also controls the legality of the acts, the functioning of the local
administrative organs and the appointment and promotion of the personnel in
these organs.56 Regarding political relations, because of the dependency
relationship between the centre and the local, partisanship sometimes has an
impact on the distribution of resources.57 In terms of financial relations, the local
institutions are not autonomous in terms of either their revenues or expenditures.
Challenges to decentralization in Turkey
Turkey’s historical heritage and its republican state tradition have acted as
obstacles to decentralization as understood in the European context. It seems
that the distribution of powers and competences between the centre and the
local has been to the advantage of the former, especially with the principle of
administrative tutelage governing the relations between the two levels. The main
difficulties of the system stem from the lack of public participation in
local decision making, lack of transparency and lack of financial resources.58
The effects of Turkey’s centralized state tradition create a number of major
obstacles to restructuring the administration in its efforts to prepare for EU
membership. These difficulties are as follows: the centralized state tradition
with its excessively centralized planning, decision making, and personnel and
resource management; the highly politicized Turkish bureaucratic tradition
lacking cooperation between the centre and the local; the patron–client
relationships and dependence on the centre for financial resources; the lack of
capabilities to deal with the local problems; application of the same centrally
defined policies regardless of regional disparities; fears regarding the
fragmentation of the state due to Kurdish separatist movements in South-east
Anatolia.59
Of the problems listed above, one is particularly critical. The Turkish
public administration system suffers from unclear boundaries concerning
administrative tutelage of the centre over the local. The 1930 Municipal Law, for
example, states that:
55 Rus¸en Keles¸, Avrupa’nın Bu¨tu¨nles¸mesi ve Yerel Yo¨netimler, Tu¨rk Belediyecilik Derneg˘i ve Konrad
Adenauer Vakfı, Ankara, 1999, pp. 308–310; S. Yalc¸ındag˘, F. Almanya’da ve Tu¨rkiye’de Yerel Yo¨netimler,
TODAI˙E, Ankara, 1992, pp. 5–13; Prime Ministry of Turkish Republic, The Restructuring of Public
Administration, Ankara, 2003.
56 Keles¸, op. cit., pp. 30–32, Article 127 of the Constitution.
57 Ibid., p. 313.
58 Turgay Uzun and Hu¨seyin Kurt, ‘Avrupa Birlig˘i’ne Giris¸ Su¨recinde Tu¨rkiye’de Yerel Yo¨netimler
ve Sorunları’, in Bekir Parlak and Hu¨seyin O¨zgu¨r (eds), Avrupa Birligi ile Bu¨tu¨nles¸me Su¨recinde Yerel
Yo¨netimler, Alfa Yayınları, I˙stanbul, 2002, p. 83.
59 Ergu¨der, op. cit., pp. 19–21.
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in case of a severe interruption of delivery of services, an appropriate amount of
time is given to the local administration for remedying the situation and if the
problem is not solved in the given time period, the measures required by the
situation are taken by the centre.
The problems with this article are the ambiguity of ‘severe interruption’, the lack
of a specified duration of time for remedying the situation and the undefined
nature of the measures to be taken by the central administration.60 Another
problem concerns the division of responsibilities between the centre and local
level administrations, as well as between the metropolitan level and district level
administrations.61 Municipal ‘activities’ are unclear and ambiguously defined
and there is confusion in terms of the responsibilities of each.62 The following
areas of conflict exist between the metropolitan and the district municipalities:
issuing of construction licenses, property rights over municipal real estate,
responsibility for maintenance of main streets, and regulation of markets and
shopping areas.63 The fact that there is no clear division of responsibilities and
competences between different local administrative bodies has various
implications in terms of the accountability of these bodies to the people, and
thus raises concerns about the efficiency and democratic qualities of the
administrative system.
The problems discussed so far already represent significant difficulties.
However, the most important challenge of decentralization for Turkey is the large
internal disparity between the eastern and western areas. Broadly speaking,
although the eastern half of the country accounts for 37 per cent of the
population, its share of GNP is only 22 per cent. In contrast, the western part of
the country, with 63 per cent of the population accounts for 78 per cent of GDP.
GDP per capita ratio is 60 for eastern Turkey and 123 for western Turkey (2004
national average ¼ 100).64
The case of the South-east Anatolia region, which is largely populated by
Kurdish-origin Turkish citizens, illustrates the constraints on Turkey’s
adaptation to the ‘multi-level governance’ model implied by the EU’s regional
policy. Despite the existence of a regional development administration, there is a
challenging combination of institutional fragmentation, lack of institutional
networks, a very strong state presence and quasi-feudalism. The ethnic structure
of the region and the state elites’ associated perception of a threat to Turkey’s
territorial integrity have turned the concept of decentralization into a security
issue.65 This is due to the radical activities of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party),
aimed at establishing an independent Kurdish state. The suspicions about the
long-term implications of decentralization in the form of secession in the south-
eastern part of the country have prevented Turkey from initiating the necessary
steps for the decentralization of the administrative system.
60 Aykut Polatog˘lu, ‘Tu¨rk kamu yo¨netim sisteminin yeniden o¨rgu¨tlenmesi u¨zerine du¨s¸u¨nceler’,
Amme I˙daresi Dergisi, 36(4), 2003, p. 6.
61 Azaklı, op. cit., p. 155.
62 Kalaycıog˘lu, op. cit., p. 12.
63 Ibid., p. 18.
64 T. Reeves, ‘Turkey’s regional policy on the road to the EU’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 4(3), 2005,
p. 6.
65 Ertugal, op. cit.
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Europeanization and decentralization in Turkey
The differences between Turkey and the European countries regarding the
understanding and practice of centre–local relations can also be seen in Turkey’s
approval of the European Charter on Local Self-Government in 1991. Turkey did
this only with certain reservations regarding the organizational, administrative and
financial autonomy of local governments, together with their rights to cooperate
with each other and go to court for the judicial review of decisions and acts.66
Nevertheless, Turkey has attempted to restructure the system of public
administration over the last few years through the Urgent Action Plan of the
Government and the Draft Framework Law on Public Administration. Within
this context, the government prepared a comprehensive public administration
reform plan, the legal basis for which is provided by several laws, such as the
Public Administration Draft Law, the Law on Metropolitan Municipalities, the
Law on Municipalities and the Draft Law on Special Provincial Administrations.
The priorities of this reform are as follows: strengthening the capability of local
decision making with improved organizational, managerial and information
systems, modernized working and communication procedures, and a more
professional and neutral civil service; continuing the decentralization process
and strengthening local authorities; modernizing public finance management
and increasing the degree of transparency for citizens; and creating partnerships
with civil society.67
In parallel with public administration reform studies and the EU accession
process, Turkey is in close cooperation with OECD/SIGMA (Support for the
Improvement of Governance in Management of the Administration) to improve
the Turkish public administration system.68 The intention is to stimulate a debate
in Turkey on the need for, and goals of, reforming public administration, and to
raise awareness about the principles governing the European Administrative
Space, as well as the implications of EU membership for administration.69
During Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU, the chapter on ‘Regional
Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments’ will be one of the most
difficult, due to the severity of the regional imbalances and low income levels in
Turkey. This chapter will also be one of the most important, since Turkey has been
witnessing a transformation in terms of development policy and public
administration. As a part of this transformation process, since 1999, Turkey has
launched regional development programmes as well as cross-border cooperation
programmes. Although these programmes are limited in scope and financial
resources, they provide a good starting point for planning and monitoring the
regional development programmes.70
66 Mustafa O¨kmen, ‘Yerel Yo¨netimlerde O¨zerklik Eg˘ilimleri: Avrupa ve Tu¨rkiye’, in Bekir Parlak
and Hu¨seyin O¨zgu¨r (eds), Avrupa Birligi ile Bu¨tu¨nles¸me Su¨recinde Yerel Yo¨netimler, Alfa Yayınları,
I˙stanbul, 2002, p. 114.
67 Murat Sungar, ‘Turkish–EU negotiations: prospective effects on public administration and
regional development’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 4(3), 2005.
68 In 2004, the European Commission requested SIGMA (a joint initiative of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union), principally financed by
the European Union, to assess the current state of central systems in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
69 Sungar, op. cit.
70 Ibid.
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Despite this activity, the Regular Progress Reports on Turkey prepared by the
European Commission every year since 2000 have stated that ‘no notable change
has occurred at the level of regional and local government. The strong control
of the central administration over local institutions continues to exist.’71
The Turkish public administration system has to be reorganized in a way that
is compatible with the common political values of the EU for stable and
institutionalized democracy, concern for human rights and protection of
minorities.72 In the course of the Europeanization process, there have been
some public administration reform attempts such as the MEHTAP Project
(Merkezi Hu¨ku¨met Teskilati Arastirma Projesi—Central Government Structure
Research Project) of 1962–63. This concerned the reorganization of the central
administration and did not deal with the local administrative structure. There
was also the KAYA Project (Kamu Yo¨netimi Arastirma Projesi—Public Adminis-
tration Research Project) of 1988, which started within the context of administrative
adjustment to the EU.73 However, these projects were not successful, primarily
because their philosophy was not suited to the European model, but also because
of political instability, lack of continuation, bureaucratic resistance and the lack
of the necessary legislative and constitutional changes.74
The latest attempt at reforming the Turkish public administration system was
‘the Law on the Basic Principles and Reorganization of Public Administration’
in 2004. Quite remarkably, this draft law tried to introduce the principle of
subsidiarity into the Turkish administrative system, to redefine the powers and
responsibilities of the central and local administrative structures and to redefine
central–local relations by giving more weight to the latter.75 More specifically,
this law aimed at the following: to decrease the number of ministries at the
central level; to make the local administrations compatible with the European
Charter on Local Autonomy; to define the powers and responsibilities of the
central and local administrations; to decentralize the public administration
system; to introduce the principle of subsidiarity; and to establish Regional
Development Agencies.76
However, the president vetoed the law on the grounds that it was against
the constitution as it proposed limiting the powers and responsibilities of the
centre and giving extended powers to the local administrations, weakening the
organizational and functional features of the central administration and
violating the deconcentration and administrative tutelage principles.77 At the
same time, other critics of the draft law attacked it on the grounds that it was
not a genuine attempt at decentralization. The powers and responsibilities
were left to the provincial administration, thus to the governor, who is
appointed by the central administration. Thus, according to these critics, rather
71 European Commission, Progress Reports, 2000–2008, ,www.europa.eu.int..
72 Asım Balcı, ‘Tu¨rkiye-AB ilis¸kileri perspektifinden kamu yo¨netimi sisteminin yeniden
yapılandırılması’, Amme Idaresi Dergisi, 38(4), 2005, p. 25.
73 Bas¸bakanlık, Kamu Yo¨netiminde Yeniden Yapılanma, Bas¸bakanlık, Ankara, 2003, pp. 115–116.
74 Ibid.
75 ,www.todaie.gov.tr/KYP/5227.htm..
76 Bas¸bakanlık, op. cit., pp. 139–162.
77 T. C. Cumhurbaskanligi Sayi: B. 01.0. KKB. 01-18/A. 9.2004-890 03/08/2004, ,www.todaie.
gov.tr/KYP/5227_veto.htm..
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than create decentralization, the draft law simply reproduced centralization at
the local level.78
Although local government and public administration reform is not one of
the preconditions of membership, as the Committee of Regions Opinion on
Turkey’s Accession of 6 July 2005 demonstrates, Turkey is expected to transform
its administrative system in accordance with EU norms in the following respects:
by passing a public administration reform package as quickly as possible; by
giving more powers and public resources to popularly elected local and regional
representatives; by establishing a legal framework for regional development
policy; and by accepting the principle of local and regional autonomy in
accordance with the European Charter on Local Autonomy. Moreover, issues
related to local governments are a part of 12 of the 35 chapters, which Turkey has
to negotiate during the accession process. Thus, local government reform is an
inescapable part of the adoption of the acquis.79
In order to assist Turkey in reforming her public administration, the European
Commission provided financial resources between 2005 and 2007 for the
‘Assistance to Local Government Reform Project’, which was carried out by
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This project aimed to
develop democratic decision-making mechanisms at the local level, to increase
the administrative and financial autonomy of the local administrations and
to improve the quality of the local services through capacity development,
educational programmes and seminars, and cooperation among local
administrations.80
Concluding remarks: future prospects
Decentralization, which is an important part of the acquis has posed important
challenges for Turkey. The challenges stem basically from the different
understandings and historical traditions of the European and Turkish contexts.
While in the European tradition, the concept of local government has evolved
from a feudal past and persisted to a great extent during the nation-state building
and European integration processes, in the Ottoman–Turkish context, its
development neither stemmed from a historical reality as feudalism nor played
an important role in the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic.
On the contrary, the centralized nature of the Turkish state, which continued
in many respects the Ottoman tradition, and the weakness of the periphery
prevented the development of a local government tradition. Nevertheless,
recognizing the correlation between the local governance and the democratic
tradition, the ruling elites from time to time attempted a decentralization process
within the context of democratization. As mentioned above, the decentralization
process tended to take place in the aftermath of military interventions in Turkey,
as seen following the post-1960 and post-1980 interventions.
78 Keles¸, op. cit., p. 95.
79 These 12 chapters are environment, consumer protection, transportation, justice and home
affairs, energy management, competition law, free movement of people and anti-discriminatory
measures, social policy, public procurement procedures, state aid, free movement of goods and local
elections (,www.deltur.cec.eu.int/belediyeler.html. ).
80 ,www.tepav.org.tr/eng/admin/dosyabul/upload/Yerel_Yonetim_Reformuna_Destek_
Projesi_Fikret_Toksoz_ppt..
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Needless to say, the opening of negotiations with the EU and the chapters
related to local government have provided an important stimulus for reforming
the public administration system in Turkey with the aim of harmonizing Turkish
and European practices. The reform attempts in the field of decentralization have
gained pace within the context of Europeanization since the 1990s. When one
considers the three Europeanization mechanisms of Knill and Lehmkuhl, it can
be argued that the process of Europeanization in the field of decentralization has
not really succeeded in the Turkish context. The first mechanism, that is,
domestic institutional change, has been very limited. In fact, there is still no layer
of governance in Turkey comparable to regional governments in most European
countries. With respect to the second mechanism, there are attempts at significant
policy changes as seen from the examples of draft laws and reform attempts at
greater decentralization. However, the presidential veto and resistance among
the bureaucratic and state elite have proven that the third mechanism of
Europeanization has also not been effective, as an administrative local culture
has not been internalized and developed yet.
The reasons for this insufficient decentralization are primarily the strong state
tradition, the related lack of local consciousness about self-government, regional
disparities, the lack of an administrative local culture and the lack of harmonization
between central and local interests. The future prospects for decentralization will
depend on the extent to which it will be possible to create more correspondence
between the European and Turkish understandings of local government.
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